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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 6
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS NOT
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT**
Section 136. DUTIES CREATED BY A PROMISE To DiscARaGF
A DUTY.
(1) Except as stated in Sections 140, 143,
(a) a promise to discharge the promisee's duty creates a
duty of the promisor to the creditor beneficiary to
perform the promise;
(b) a promise to discharge the promisee's duty creates
also a duty to the promisee;
(c) whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor's duty
to the creditor beneficiary satisfies to that extent the
promisor's duty to the promisee;
(d) whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor's duty
to the promisee in any other way than by rendering
the promised performance in whole or in part does
not limit the promisor's duty to the creditor bene-
ficiary
(2) Whether the extent of the promisor's duty to the
creditor beneficiary is measured by the promisee's actual,
supposed, or asserted duty to the beneficiary at the time
of the making of the contract, or at some other time, de-
pends upon the interpretation of the promise.
Comment on Subsectson (1)
a. Though the right of the creditor beneficiary arises immediately
on the formation of the contract, his right, unlike that of a donee
beneficiary is not immediately indefeasible. As stated m Section
143, until the creditor brings suit, or otherwise materially changes
his position in reliance on the promise, he may lose his right or have
it qualified by a new agreement between the promisor and the
promisee.
b. A contract to satisfy a duty of the promisee to another is an
intangible asset of the promisee, peculiar in this respect, that it
cannot generally be made available by any creditor but the bene-
ficiary
c. If, after breach by the promisor, the beneficiary obtains pay-
ment from the promisee, the promisee has an election between a
right of action for damages against the promisor and a right to
recover the consideration paid. Either right can be made available
by general creditors.
d. The value of the promisee's property is increased to the ex-
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
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tent that the contract is of value to hn. It is an intangible asset.
The law allows a direct action by the creditor beneficiary against
the promisor without joining the promisee, instead of requiring
a procedure like garnishment or a suit to realize on an asset of
the debtor not available to seizure by ordinary legal process. Ordi-
narily the value of the asset is the amount of the debt which the
promisor has undertaken to pay, but, as Illustrations 3 and 4
indicate, this will not always be the case. (Illustration 3. A prom-
ises C in writing for sufficient consideration to have a fence built
between their estates, and C pays A the price of the fence. A and
C know at the time that A has cattle which are likely to injure
C's property if the fence is not built as agreed. B contracts with
A to carry out A's contract with C that the fence shall be built
and shall be paid for on completion of the work. B is shown the
writing containing A's contract with C, but B does not know that
A has cattle. The fence is not built as contracted, and due to that
fact A's cattle enter C's property and cause great damage. Both
C and A can recover judgment against B though the damages
recoverable may not be the same as could be recovered by C from
A, since the chance of special injury in case of breach was known
to A when he contracted, but was not known to B when he con-
tracted.) (Illustration 4. A owes 0 $1000. For sufficient considera-
tion B promises A to pay C $1000 for an assignment of C's right.
On tender of such an assignment C can recover from B on his
promise.)
e. The. promisor who undertakes to pay a debt of the promisee
subjects himself to a duty both to the promisee and to the creditor
beneficiary A single performance, however, rendered to the bene-
ficiary will satisfy both obligations. As to the right to specific
performance see Section 138.
f It is unmaterial whether the duty of the promisee to the
creditor beneficiary arises from a bargain between them or is
created by an assumption by the promisee, acting as promisor in
a previous contract, of some duty due by another to the creditor
benefieiary, or is a non-contractual duty
Comment on Subsection (2)
g. Where a promisee believes that he is or may be indebted to
a third person and contracts with a promisor with a view to his
discharge, the promise may take one of four forms firstly, to pay
the third person whatever is due him at the time of the promise,
secondly, to pay the third person whatever may be due at the
time when performance becomes due him or is claimed byf him,
thirdly, to pay the third person a fixed sum which the promisee
rightly or wrongly assumes to be due, or wishes to have paid
whether due or not, or, fourthly, to take whatever measures may
be necessary to obtain the promisee's freedom from liability
h. Promises in the first and second forms present typical cases
of creditor beneficiaries. In promises in the third form also the
36 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
beneficiary is a creditor beneficiary as that term is defined m Sec-
tion 133 (1, b), even though the claim is not well founded. In
promises in the fourth form the creditor is neither a donee bene-
ficiary nor a creditor beneficiary A promise however that is ap-
parently in the fourth form may in view of accompanying circum-
stances sometimes be properly interpreted as falling within one of
the other classes.
s. Where a promise is to pay a particular claim the proper in-
terpretation of the promise will generally be that no supervening
defences to the claim shall excuse the promisor. His undertaking
is not discharged by such circumstances as the promisee's subse-
quent discharge in bankruptcy or the running of the Statute of
Limitations in favor of the promisee. Where, however, the promise
is to assume the debts of the promisee, as where a new corporation
or new partnership makes such a promise to another corporation
or partnership, the interpretation will often be proper that the
promisor undertakes to pay only creditors who have valid claims
when they assert them.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (1) (a). The Washington cases are in accord with this
Section.
In the following cases the creditor of a vendor of goods was allowed
to recover from the vendee who, as part of the purchase price, agreed to
pay the vendor's debt to the creditor- Silsby -v. Frost, 3 W Terr. 388, 17
P. 887 (1888) Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 W 459, 47 P. 964(1897) Gilmore v. Skookuim Box Factory, 20 W 703, 56 P. 934 (1899)
Reiley v. Spokane Sanitary Laundry Co., 71 W 516, 128 P 1075 (1913).
The right of the mortgagee to recover on the debt against a grantee of
the mortgaged premises who promises his grantor to pay -the debt has
been recognized in the following cases: Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co. v.
Robins, 14 W 507, 45 P 39 (1896) equitable subrogation theory of Keller
v. Ashor, 133 U. S. 610 followed, Ordway v. Downey, 18 W 412, 51 P. 1047(1898) Harbican v. Chamberlin, 82 W 556, 144 P 717 (1914) Corkrell V.
Poe, 100 W 625, 171 P 522 (1918) First State Bank v. Arneson, 109 W
346, 186 P. 889 (1920) Bollong v. Corman, 117 W 336, 201 P 297 (1921)
Insley v. Webb, 122 W 98, 209 P 1093 (1922) Hargts v. Hargss, 160 W
594, 295 P. 742 (1931) In Frazey v. Casey, 96 W 422, 165 P 104 (1917),
where the mortgage debt was represented by a promissory note and the
mortgaged premises were sold to defendant who orally promised to pay
the note, it was held that the holder of the instrument could not main-
tain an action on it against the purchaser under Rem. Code Section 3409,
providing that no person is liable on an instrument whose signature does
not appear thereon. The right of the mortgagee beneficiary to sue on the
independent promise, however, seems conceded. It was so held in Frazey
v. Casey, supra, distinguished In Federal Bank v. Miller 155 W 479, 484,
284 P 751 (1930) The doctrine that no action can be brought on the
instrument, except against persons whose names appear thereon, was re-
affirmed in State Bank v. Adkins, 134 W 94, 99- 235 P 18 (1925).
In Dtnanck v. Collins, 24 W 78, 63 P 1101 (1901) the right of a
creditor to sue his debtor's vendee who promised to pay vendor's debt
was recognized, Lian v. Huglen, 141 W 369, 251 P 585 (1926) purchaser
of cannery and equipment, promising to employ plaintiff who had existing
contract of employment, held liable to employee; Zioncheck v. Hepden,
144 W 272, 257 P 835 (1927), creditor holding note of partnership may
recover on promise of vendee of partnership's assets to pay the partner-
ship's debts; in Moore v. Baasc, 109 W 568, 187 P 388 (1920), officers
and stockholders of two banks reciprocally guaranteed paper taken over
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by an amalgamated bank, held, bank taking over the paper and state bank
examiner taking over the bank on its insolvency may maintain action upon
the guaranty. While regarded by the court as a case where the promisor
agrees to pay debt to the beneficiary, it seems rather a case where the
promisor has promised the promisee to pay the debt of a third party
(persons liable on the paper) to the beneficiary.
The right of a person injured by the negligence of the insured to re-
cover against the Insurance company on a liability policy issued to the
Insured and providing for such an action by the injured person, has been
recognized in the following cases: Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co.,
126 W 543, 219 P. 12 (1923) Stusser v,. Mutual Union Insurance Go., 127
W 449, 221 P. 331 (1923).
Liability of surety on contractor's bond to laborers and materialmen.
Where a private bond is given to secure performance by contractor and
to indemnify owner against claims for labor and materials, surety on the
bond is not liable in an action by the workman or materlalman: Sears
'v. Williams, 9 W 428, 37 P. 665 (1894) Armur & Co. . Western Con-
struction Co., 36 W 529, 78 P. 1106 (1905) Spokane Merchants Assn. v.
Pacific Surety Co., 86 W 489, 150 P. 1054 (1914), bond conditioned that
contractor "shall pay all laborers, mechanics, subcontractors, and ma-
terialmen and all persons who shall supply such laborers, etc., with
materials, etc."* Rust v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 87 W 93, 151
P. 248 (1915), bond conditioned "for the payment of all liens, claims, and
other sums of money" Du Pont de Nemours Co. v. National Surety Co.,
90 W 227, 155 P. 1050 (1916), rehearing 94 W 461, 162 P. 866; Boa Marche
Realty Co. v. Soutkern Surety Co., 152 W 604, 278 P. 679 (1929), semble;
Forsyth v. New York Indemnity Co., 159 W 318, 293 P. 284 (1930). Contra:
McDonald v. Davey, 22 W 366, 60 P. 1116 (1900), but overruled by
Armour & Co. v. Western Construction Co. and Forsyth v. New York
Indemnity Co., supra, Du Pont Co. v. Columbta Casualty Co., 150 W 362,
273 P. 181 (1928).
Where bond is given in pursuance of statute for construction of public
improvements and conditioned to pay laborers, materialmen, etc., such
bonds are "presumptively given for benefit of creditors to take the place
of a lien which does not lie against a municipality and materialmen or
laborers may recover against the surety"- Baum v. County of Whatcom,
19 W 626, 54 P. 29 (1898) Pacific Bridge Co. v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 33 W.
47, 73 P. 772 (1903), semble; Rust v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 87 W 93, 97" 151
P. 248 (1915), dictum
Subsection (1) (b). What authority there is, is in accord with the Re-
statement: Frazey v. Casey, 96 W 422, 424. 165 P. 104 (1917), dictum,
Canders v. Sheets 142 W 155, 252 P. 531 (1927), mortgagor paying de-
ficiency judgment to mortgagee may recover the sum paid for vendee
under real estate contract who has agreed with mortgagor to pay 'the
debt.
Subsection (1) (c) and (d). While no Washington cases have been
found squarely in point, it is believed that these Sections state the rule
that would be followed.
Section 137. DIscIxER 3Y A BENEjCIARY.
A donee beneficiary or a creditor beneficiary who has
not previously assented to the promise for his benefit, may,
in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and
terms, render the duty to-himself inoperative from the be-
ginning by disclaimer, unless such action is a fraud on
creditors.
Comment
a. Disclaimer by the beneficiary will usually render performance
by the promisor impossbile without fault on his part, for perfor-
mance will usually require co-operation by the beneficiary Where
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no such co-operation is necessary, the promisor can perform his
duty to the promisee, and may be sued by the promisee if he fails
to do so. The beneficiary, however, even though he change his
mind after diselaiming, will have no right of his own.
b. Where performance requires co-operation, it may become im-
possible though there has been no disclaimer, for the beneficiary
may, when the time for co-operation arrives, refuse to give it.
Wherever the promisor's performance becomes impossible without
his fault, whether by disclaimer by the beneficiary or by the bene-
ficiary's refusal to give necessary co-operation, the duty of the
promisor to the promisee will be governed by the principles gen-
erally applicable to contracts which have become impossible of
performance (see Sections 454-469, Chapter 14)
ANNOTATION
No Washington case has been found squarely involving this problem.
Section 138. ALLOWANCE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
If specific enforcement of a duty owed to a doneee bene-
ficiary or to a creditor beneficiary is possible and in accord-
ance with the rules of equity, a suit for such enforcement
can be maintained. The suit may be brought either by the
promisee or by the beneficiary
ANNOTATION
While no Washington cases have been found in which specific perform-
ance has been decreed, there is no reason apparent or suggested in the
cases why in an appropriate case, it should not be.
Section 139. BENEFICIARIES UNIDENTIFIED AT THE TIME OF
CONTRACT.
It is not essential to the creation of a right in a donee ben-
eficiary or in a creditor beneficiary that he be identified
when a contract containing the promise is made.
ANNOTATION
Washington cases are in accord with this Section.
Reiley v. Spokane Sanitary Laundry Co., 71 W 516, 128 P 1075 (1913)
Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 W 543, 219 P 12 (1923)
Stusser v. Mutual Unson Insurance Co., 127 W 449, 221 P 331 (1923)
Washington Perfection Co. v. Damn, 138 W 427, 244 P 697 (1926), agree-
ment of defendant "to personally pay each and every said indebtedness
of said corporation" may be enforced by creditor of the corporation al-
though he was not at the time identified.
Section 140. AvAILABILITY AGAINST A BENEFICIARY OF THE
PROMISOR'S DEFENSES AGAINST THE PROMISEE.
There can be no donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary
unless a contract has been formed between a promisor and
promisee; and if a contract is conditional, voidable, or unen-
forceable at the time of its formation, or subsequently
ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impos-
sibility, illegality or the present or prospective failure of the
promisee to perform a return promise which was the con-
sideration for the promisor's promise, the right of a donee
beneficiary or creditor beneficiary under the contract is sub-
ject to the same limitation.
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ANNOTATION
Accord (donee beneficiary), Thorma v. Grand Lodge, 12 W 500, 41 P.
882 (1895), evidence of misrepresentations of insured in application for
insurance in mutual benefit society admissible against beneficiary in suit
on the policy.
Merrnmanv '. Maryland Casualty Co., 147 W 579, 266 P. 682 (1928), right
of injured person to maintain action on liability policy is subject to con-
ditions in the policy that insurance company shall have the right to de-
fend on the merits any action brought against assured and that assured
shall furnish copy of summons or process served upon him.
Section 141. A CREDITOR BENiEIFicRY's RIGHTS TO JUDGMENT
AND SATISFACTION. PROMISEE'S RIGHT AGAINST THE PROMISOR.
(1) A creditor beneficiary who has an enforceable claim
against the promisee can get judgment against either the
promisee or the promisor or against each of them on their
respective duties to him. Satisfaction in whole or in part of
either of these duties, or of judgments thereon, satisfies to
that extent the other duty or judgment.
(2) To the extent that a creditor beneficiary satisfies his
claim from assets of the promisee without resorting to the
promisor's contract the promisee has a right of reimburse-
ment from the promisor, which may be enforced directly
and also, if the creditor beneficiary's claim is fully satis-
fied, by subrogation to the claim of the creditor beneficiary
against the promisor, and to any judgment thereon and to
any security therefor of the promisor.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (1). Gilmore v. Skookum Box Factory, 20 W 703 at 707,
56 P. 934 (1899), and Johnson v. Shuey, 40 W 22, 29, 30; 82 P. 123 (1905),
are in accord with this Section.
Section 142. VARATION OF THE DUTY TO A DONEE BENEFICIARY
BY AGREEMENT OF PROMISOR AND PROMISEE.
Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the
promisor to the donee beneficiary cannot be released by
the promisee or affected by any agreement between the
promisee and the promisor, but if the promisee receives
consideration for an attempted release or discharge of the
promisor's duty, the donee beneficiary can assert a right
to the consideration so received, and on doing so loses his
right against the promisor.
comment
a. The reservation of power on the part of the promsee to
change the beneficiary or otherwise to vary the terms of a gift
promise must ordinarily be expressed in specific terms. Such a
power, however, exists though not so expressed in a member of a
fraternal benefit society to change the beneficiary of the insurance
to which his membership entitles him, unless the charter or by-laws
of the society otherwise provide.
ANNOTATION
See annotation to Section 133 (1) (a).
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Section 143. VARIATION OP1 THE PROMISOR'S DUTY TO A CRED-
ITOR BENEPICIARY BY AGREEMENT OP PROMISOR AND PROMISEE.
A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract
or a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor
beneficiary if,
(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the
promise or otherwise materially change his position
in reliance thereon before he knows of the discharge
or variation, and
(b) the promisee's action is not a fraud on creditors.
Comment
a. The beneficiary is justified in relying on the promise and it
is immaterial whether he learns of it from the promisor, the prom-
isee or a third party If there is a material change of position in
reliance on the promise the change of position precludes discharge
or variation of the contract without his consent. It is not neces-
sary that the creditor beneficiary enter into a novation with the
promisor, though a novation would a fortiori be effectual. What
is essential for a novation is stated in Sections 424-430, Chapter
13. The present Section does not deal with such a case, but only
with the rights of the beneficiary under the contract between the
promisor and the promisee.
b. Aside from cases of justifiable reliance, this Section states an
application of the law governing fraudulent conveyances to re-
leases and to agreements to rescind or vary a prior contract to dis-
charge a duty of the promisee. Even if the creditor beneficiary
has taken no action in reliance on the promise the promisee cannot
be permitted to impair the asset value of the promise if doing this
will operate to defraud either the creditor beneficiary or the prom-
isee's other creditors. If there is an actual intent on the part of
the promisee to defraud, the promisor can claim no advantage from
a release or rescission unless he. gave value therefor and was ignor-
ant of the promisee's wrongful intent. Furthermore, however in-
nocent the promisee's intent may have been, if a release or rescis-
sion leaves him without assets sufficient to satisfy all his creditors,
the release or rescission is a fraud upon the creditor beneficiary
and also upon the promisee's other creditors. Here also, unless
the promisor gave value for the release or rescission without knowl-
edge of the circumstances rendering the transaction improper, he
cannot take advantage of it.
ANNOTATION
McConaitghy v. Juvenal, 73 W 166, 171, 172; 131 P 851 (1913). The
defendants who guaranteed fire losses of a mutual fire insurance com-
pany cannot, after policies are written on the strength of such guaran-
tees, set up as against claims under policies, either a release by the in-
surance company or a counter claim against it; Moore v. Baasch, 109 W
568, 187 P 388 (1920). Where officers and stockholders of two banks had
reciprocally guaranteed paper taken over by an amalgamated bank and
there had been assent and reliance by the amalgamated bank, the guar-
antors cannot annul the contract and thus defeat the rights of the bene-
ficiary by mutual releases.
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Section 144. EFFECT OF AN ERRONEOUS BELIEF AS TO THE EX-
ISTENCE OF A DUTY OF THE PROMISEE TO TE BENEFICIARY.
Unless the case is within the rules making contracts void-
able for mutual mistake, where performance of a promise
in a contract will benefit a person other than the promisee,
the promisor's duty is not avoided or limited by an errone-
ous belief of the promisor or of the promisee as to the exist-
ence or extent of a duty of the promisee to the beneficiary.
Comment
a. The various forms in which a promise to pay a real or sup-
posed debt may be made are stated in Section 136 (2) and the
Comment thereon.
b. The case stated in the present Section is that of a promise to
pay a stated sum supposed to be due, where the promisee's belief
as to his indebtedness is erroneous. The beneficiary is a creditor
beneficiary if there is no intent to make a gift, though, if nothing
is actually due the beneficiary, performance will give the same
advantage as a gift would. The circumstances of mutual mistake
on the part of both the promisor and the promisee, however, may
be sufficient to make such a contract voidable under rules stated
in Sections 500-510, Chapter 17.
ANNOTATION
Illustration No. 2 under this Section states the following case: A, the-
owner of Blackacre, mortgages it to C for $5000. A conveys Blackaere
subject to the mortgage to Z, who does not assume or agree to pay the
mortgage debt. Z conveys Blackacre to B, who by the deed of convey-
ance assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage debt. C may recover judg-
ment against B unless B can establish such a mutual mistake on the part
of himself and Z as invalidates B's agreement.
In connection with this illustration see Corkrefll v. Poe, 100 W 625
171 P. 522 (1918), where it was held that guarantee who assumes mort-
gage was liable to mortgagee for deficiency judgment even though his.
grantor, a grantee from the mortgagor, was not liable on the debt.
Section 145. BENEFICIARIES UNDER PROMISES TO THE UNITED-
STATES, A STATE, OR A MUNICIPALITY.
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or
municipality by contract to do an act or render a service to
some or all of the members of the public, is subject to no
duty under the contract to such members to give compensa-
tion for the injurious consequences of performing or at-
tempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless,
(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as inter-
preted in the light of the circumstances surrounding-
its formation, that the promisor shall compensate
members of the public for such injurious conse-
quences, or
(b) the promisor's contract is with a municipality to ren-
der services the non-performance of which wouldc
subject the municipality to pay damages to those
injured thereby
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Comment
a. Clause (a) is a special application of the principles stated m
Sections 133 (la), 135. Clause (b) is a special application of the
principles stated in Sections 133 (1b), 136.
ANNOTATION
McPhee v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 52 W 154, 100 P 174(1909). Sheriff not liable on official bond to persons entitled to reward
for capturing criminal where sheriff permitted escape where official bond
was conditioned to "well, truly and faithfully perform all of his duties as
sheriff" under statute giving right of action on the bond to all persons
injured or aggrieved by his wrongful act or default. Kangley v. Rogers.
85 W 250, 147 P 898 (1915), notary liable on official bond for damage
caused to mortgagee by false certification of notary that wife of mort-
gagor personally appeared before him. But notary is not liable on offi-
cial bond for signing the jurat to a false affidavit, although he knows
the affidavit to be false. Saevoff v. Steffan, 123 W 225, 212 P 158
(1923) Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 W 318, 170 P 1023 (1918), person in-
jured by fellow prisoner can recover on sheriff's official bond if jury
finds under circumstances it was negligent for sheriff to place insane
suspect in cell with plaintiff; see also, in connection with liability on
official bonds, R. C. S. Sections 959, 960, 9932.
Section 146. DUTIES CREATED BY A PROMISE TO DISCHARGE A DUTY.
A creditor beneficiary who holds security for the per-
formance due him and who, knowing of the contract be-
tween the promisor and the promisee, voluntarily or negli-
gently surrenders to the promisor all or any part of the se-
curity or imnpairs or destroys the same, thereby limits his
right against the promisee to the extent that he is injured
by the diminution or destruction of the value of the security
Comment
a. The Section is an application of a principle of suretyship. By
the contract between the promisor and promisee the relation be-
tween them becomes that of principal and surety
ANNOTATION
Insley v. Webb, 122 W 98, 209 P. 1093 (1922), the mortgagee's re-
lease of grantee who has assumed the mortgage debt discharges the mort-
gagor from liability on deficiency judgment. Continental Mutual Savings
Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash. 283, 6 P (2d) 638 (1932), where a mortgagee
gives an extension of time to a grantee who has assumed the mortgage
debt represented by a promissory note, the mortgagor is not released in
view of Section 119 N. I. L. (R. C. S. Section 3509) providing for methods
-of discharge of persons primarily liable on a negotiable instrument. First
State Bank v. Arneson, 109 Wash. 346, 186 P. 889 (1920), and Insley v.
Webb, supra, are thus distinguished: "but in neither of these cases was
the action based upon an instrument negotiable in form, and in neither
was the negotiable instrument's act in any manner referred to," Bank v.
Elliott, supra, at p. 300.
Section 147 EFFECT OF A PROMISE OF INCIDENTAL BENEFIT.
An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the prom.
ise no right against the promisor or the promisee.
ANNOTATION
Horstmrann Co. v. Waterman, 103 Wash. 18, 173 P. 733 (1918), where
seller of corporate stock agreed with buyer and a corporation to pay all
the debts of the corporation and defendant guaranteed to the buyer and
the corporation that seller would perform his contract, creditors of the
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corporation, although they have a right against the seller (see Sections
133 (1b) and 136 (la) have no right against the guarantor. By the guar-
antor's promise the creditors are only incidentally benefited, semble:
Schoeimer v. Zeran, etc., 126 Wash. 218, 230; 217 P. 1009 (1923) where-
mortgagee contracts with defaulting mortgagor to advance $1000, "the
sum to be used in completing a building on the property," third persons
who do work on the building and claim liens thereon cannot recover on
the mortgagee's promise; Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547,
255 P. 939 (1927), "garage owner's breach of contract to repair the steer-
ing wheel of an automobile, does not give any right of action in favor of'
third persons, not parties to the contract, who were injured while riding
as guests of the owner of the car." Syllabus of the court.
Chapter 7
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND DELEGATION OF
DUTIES OR CONDITIONS*
Section 148. LIMITATIONS Am DEFINITIONS PECULIAR TO TIH
CHAPTER.
(1) The statements in this Chapter are qualified with
reference to rights and duties under negotiable instru-
ments or conveyances of land, by the special rules of law-
governing negotiable instruments, and by the rules of the
law of property creating rights in or imposing duties on a
person because he has acquired an interest in land.
(2) In this Chapter
*(a) "Right" includes all rights arising under contracts.
or for breaches of contract, and only such rights;
(b) "Obligor" means a person subject to a contractual
duty or liable for breach of a contract;
(c) "Obligee" means the original owner of a right.
Comment on subsectwn (1)
a. Negotiable instruments are excluded from the Restatement in
this Chapter as generally from the Restatement of Contracts be-
cause the rules governing them are to some extent different from
those governing the assignment of non-negotiable contractual
rights. For a similar reason a statement of the benefits and bur-
dens attached to successive owners of property because of a con-
tract m a prior conveyance or lease is omitted. The law on that
subject grew up as part of the law governing real property and is.
excluded from the Restatement of this Subject.
AxNOTATION
Where a person having a right by contract to take water from the land
of another, but who had not reduced such right to possession, sold and
conveyed by quit-claim deed said right to a third party, the deed will
be given effect not as an executed conveyance but as an executory con-
tract of assignment and the vendee as assignee will take only such inter-
est as the vendor as assignor had, which was the right to demand the
possession and enjoyment of the water right, Glasfordf & Shield v. Baker &
Cam, 1 Wash. Ter., 224 (1867).*
* The annotations for Chapter 6 were prepared by Dean Harold Shep-
herd of the University of Washington Law School. The annotations for
Chapter 7 were prepared in memorandum form by the late Professor
Harvey Lantz of the University of Washington Law School. His notes
were arranged for publication by Dean Harold Shepherd and Warren
Shattuck, student editor of the Washington Law Review.
